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I. INTRODUCTION

In civil cases, trial courts often must identify the jurisdiction whose
law will control the issues in the case. 1 Most often, the choice is between
* Senior Counsel, Thacker Robinson Zinz LPA. The author practices in the areas of contract,
corporate, and commercial litigation. He served as Chief Counsel to two Attorneys General, one from
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the law of the state in which the court sits and the law of another state. To
make that choice, the court applies the forum state’s choice-of-law rules
and principles. 2 Historically, the common law provided these rules and
principles. 3 From their earliest days, courts in the United States struggled
through the inevitably slow process of discovering common law rules for
choice-of-law questions in a federal system of independent sovereignties
that were becoming ever more interdependent.4
Forests were consumed on theories about the common-law rules,
how they are to be stated, how they could be improved, what
considerations ought to form them, etc. Academics have offered diverse,
novel approaches for courts to try. The American Law Institute (ALI)
itself has taken two separate—and quite different—passes at divining a
comprehensive set of choice-of-law rules. The ALI’s first go was the
Restatement of Conflict of Laws, which was published in 1934. 5 The
Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws was published in 1971. 6
Ohio courts actively participated in this process. 7 The nature of
Ohio’s involvement in the process changed, however, in 1984. That year,
each major political party. He also served as Chairman of the Ohio Supreme Court’s Rules Advisory
Committee and of its Evidence Rules Subcommittee. The author was a member of the Ohio
Constitution Modernization Commission. He is a fellow of Litigation Counsel of America and
member of the Order of the Coif and the American Society of Writers on Legal Subjects.
1. Although this discussion will treat choice of law as arising only once in a case, reality is
frequently more complex. The common law recognized that the law of different jurisdictions may
apply to separate issues in a single case. It referred to this possibility as “dépeçage,” which “means
‘choice of law issue by issue; the practice of applying rules of different jurisdictions to different issues
in a legal dispute.’” BRYAN A. GARNER, GARNER’S DICTIONARY OF LEGAL USAGE 266 (3d ed. 2011).
The American Law Institute’s Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws recognizes that practice. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2)(c) (AM. LAW INST. 1971) note 34 infra.
2. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 497 (1941) (“[Each state] is free
to determine whether a given matter is to be governed by the law of the forum or some other law.”).
3. Kryger v. Wilson, 242 U.S. 171, 176 (1916) (“[D]octrines of the conflict of laws . . . [are]
purely a question of local common law.”). See also Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514,
516 (1953) (“The states are free to adopt such rules of conflict of laws as they choose . . . .”); Allstate
Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 542–43 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“It is not this Court’s
function to establish and impose upon state courts a federal choice-of-law rule, nor is it our function
to ensure that state courts correctly apply whatever choice-of-law rules they have themselves
adopted.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 5 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1971) (“A
court applies the law of its own state, . . . including its own conception of Conflict of Laws. It derives
this law from the same sources which are used for determining all its law: from constitutions, treaties
and statutes, from precedent, from considerations of ethical and social need and of public policy in
general, from analogy, and from other forms of legal reasoning. . . .”).
4. A choice-of-law question was presented as early as 1788 in Camp v. Lockwood, 1 U.S. 393
(1788), 1 Dall. 393 (C.P. Phila. Cty. 1788). See also JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS (1834).
5. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, INTRODUCTION (AM. LAW. INST. LAW INST. 1934).
6. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (AM. LAW. INST. 1971).
7. See generally Sonja M. Haller, Note: Ohio Choice-of-Law Rules: A Guide to the Labyrinth,
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the Supreme Court of Ohio declared in Morgan v. Biro Manufacturing
Company that “[w]e hereby adopt the theory stated in the Restatement of
the Law of Conflicts [sic], as it . . . provides sufficient guidelines for
future litigation.” 8 Underscoring the sweep of this wholesale
incorporation into Ohio law, the court in American Interstate Insurance
Company v. G & H Service Center, Inc. made clear that in Biro
Manufacturing it had “adopted the Restatement (Second) in its entirety.” 9
The entire content of the Restatement (Second) constitutes, at best,
merely secondary legal authority regarding choice-of-law rules and
principles. 10 So, the supreme court’s prospectively “adopting” the entire
content of this secondary authority as law that will control future decisions
is a most unusual exercise of a court’s adjudicative authority. It is even
more remarkable 11—for a variety of reasons—that a court in one fell
swoop would summarily dispense with the gradual, incremental process
by which courts, through a series of cases, eventually develop commonlaw rules of decision. Had that process been followed in developing
Ohio’s choice-of-law rules, the courts would have had the benefit of
arguments that parties with personal but adverse interests would offer for
how Ohio should choose the specific rule of decision to apply generally
in cases like theirs.
This Article does not focus, however, on the odd way in which the
Restatement (Second) has been elevated into a fixture of Ohio law. It will
focus rather on the process that the Restatement (Second) prescribes for
making a choice of law and, briefly, on how Ohio courts have used that
process. Despite the Ohio Supreme Court’s emphatic reminder in
American Interstate that Ohio follows the “entire” Restatement
(Second), 12 the Ohio Supreme Court and lower courts do not apply the
entire process that the Restatement (Second) prescribes for making

44 OHIO ST. L.J. 23 (1983).
8. Morgan v. Biro Mfg. Co., 15 Ohio St. 3d 339, 341–42 (1984) (per curiam) (dictum
adopting entire Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws).
9. Am. Interstate Ins. Co. v. G&H Serv. Ctr., Inc., 112 Ohio St. 3d 521, 522 (2007).
10. See, e.g., John Henry Merryman: The Authority of Authority, 6 Sᴛᴀɴ. L. Rᴇᴠ. 613, 629
(1954).
11. A district court in Indiana was asked to predict that Ohio would adopt the entire
Restatement (Second) for all choice-of-law case that might arise. Unaware that the Ohio Supreme
Court had already done just that, the court refused to believe that a court would delegate lawmaking
authority to the ALI. See Ormond v. Anthem, Inc., No. 1:05-cv-1908-DFH-TAB, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 30230, at *57–58 (S.D. Ind. 2008) (“It is a much bigger leap to assume that the Ohio court’s
decision to adopt some sections of the Restatement amounted to a delegation to the American Law
Institute of the authority to craft Ohio’s conflicts of law jurisprudence through future revisions of the
Restatement. The court is unwilling to make that leap.”).
12. Am. Interstate Ins. Co, 112 Ohio St. 3d at 522.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2017

3

Akron Law Review, Vol. 51 [2017], Iss. 2, Art. 6

510

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[51:507

choices of law. They have, instead, consistently applied only a portion of
that process.
Even after American Interstate, Ohio courts have used the
Restatement (Second) the same way as courts do in virtually every other
jurisdiction that follows the Restatement (Second) to any extent. Their
method is simply to pluck a seemingly pertinent rule or two out of the
Restatement (Second)’s 400-plus subject-matter-specific rules for
choosing the state with the most significant relationship with a particular
issue in a lawsuit. They then use the extracted rule or rules to guide their
choices of law. They do so, however, without taking account of the
premises that the introductory sections of the Restatement (Second) built
into subject-matter-specific rules. Those premises can alter—often
materially—the apparent meaning of specific rules.
By using the Restatement (Second) in a selective and detached way,
a court limits its consideration to only the forum state’s choice-of-law
rules and principles. But in doing so, courts ignore two steps that are
elemental in the Restatement (Second)’s system for making a choice of
law. Both of these steps require the court in the forum state to take into
account choice-of-law rules of foreign states, not just the forum state’s
choice-of-law rules. The Supreme Court of Ohio missed both of the steps
in Biro Manufacturing Company. 13 And, it missed them again in American
Interstate, 14 even after reaffirming Ohio’s adoption of “the Restatement
in its entirety.” 15
This Article will discuss two steps that are commonly missed in the
Restatement (Second)’s method for choosing law. Both steps call for the
forum court to take account of foreign states’ choice-of-law rules. One
step occurs early in a choice-of-law analysis. The other occurs at the end.
The purposes of the reviews differ, but the steps are both important in the
Restatement (Second)’s system. The Article will try to explain why courts
that are otherwise willing to follow the Restatement (Second) routinely
miss them. Finally, it will demonstrate why failure to implement the steps
can result in a choice-of-law analysis that encourages forum-shopping.

13. Morgan, 15 Ohio St. 3d at 342–43 (“When confronted with a choice-of-law issue . . .
analysis must begin with Section 146 [Personal Injury].”) (Kentucky law applied).
14. Am. Interstate Ins. Co., 112 Ohio St. 3d at 522–24, 526 (“[The court began choice-of-law
analysis by] determin[ing] whether Sections 145 [the General Principle of choice of law for torts] and
146 [Personal Injury] or Section 185 of the Restatement [Action for Tort of Wrongful Death After
Rendition of an Award] applies to determine which state law controls”) (Louisiana law applied).
15. Id. at 522 (referring to Morgan, 15 Ohio St. 3d.).
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II. THE RESTATEMENTS; CONFLICT OF LAWS
A.

Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws

Although the Restatement (Second) is the most widely accepted
among a variety of methodologies for choosing law to be applied in
litigation, it nevertheless is accepted by only a minority of states as an
authoritative expression of their jurisdiction’s choice-of-law rules. 16 Ohio
is among that minority of states. The Restatement (Second)’s spotty
acceptance reflects its controversial origin and novel content.
The American Law Institute published the Restatement (Second) of
Conflict in 1971 as part of its second set of Restatements. 17 In publishing
the first set, which covered various areas of the common law, the ALI’s
objective had been narrow. Its goal was “to present an orderly statement
of the general common law of the United States.” 18 The “Restatements”
16. See Shirley A. Wiegand, Fifty Conflict of Laws Restatements: Merging Judicial Discretion
and Legislative Endorsement, 65 LA. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2004). See generally Symeon C. Symeonides,
Choice-of-Law in the American Courts in 2015: Twenty-Ninth Annual Survey, 64 AM. J. COMP. L.
243, 291 (2016). Since 1986, the American Association of Law Schools Section on Conflict of Laws
has annually counted how many states have gravitated to the Restatement (Second)’s revolutionary
approach to choice of law since it was published in 1971. The count does not track all subject areas
covered in the Restatement (Second), only the Restatement (Second)’s sections on choice of law for
torts and contracts. “[T]he American Conflict ‘revolution’ has not had an appreciable impact outside
these two areas.” P. John Kozyris & Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts
in 1989: An Overview, 38 AM. J. COMP. L. 601, 602 (1990).
17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, Introduction (AM. LAW INST. 1971).
18. See RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, Introduction (AM. LAW INST. 1934):
The object of the [American Law] Institute in preparing the Restatement is to present an
orderly statement of the general common law of the United States
.....
The Institute recognizes that the ever increasing volume of decisions . . . establishing new
rules or precedent [omitted comma] . . . and the numerous instances in which the decisions
are irreconcilable, taken in connection with the growing complications of economic and
other conditions . . . are . . . increasing the law’s uncertainty and lack of clarity and that
this will force the abandonment of our common law system . . . unless a new factor
promoting certainty and clarity can be found.
The careful restatement of our common law by the legal profession as represented in the
Institute is an attempt to supply this needed factor. The object of the Institute is
accomplished in so far as the legal profession accepts the Restatement as prima facie a
correct statement of the general law of the United States.
Id.; see also Kansas v. Nebraska, 135 S. Ct. 1042, 1064 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting) (“The object of the original Restatements was to ‘present an orderly statement of the
general common law’. . . . Over time, the Restatements’ authors have abandoned the mission of
describing the law, and have chosen instead to set forth their aspirations for what the law ought to
be. . . . [I]t cannot safely be assumed, without further inquiry, that a Restatement provision describes
rather than revises current law.”); Kristen David Adams, Blaming the Mirror: The Restatements and
the Common Law, 40 IND. L. REV. 205, 217 n. 62 (2007) (quoting LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM
AT YALE, 1927–1960 14 (UNC Press Enduring Editions 1986)). Regarding the inception of the
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in the first set were, thus, aptly named. Courts frequently accepted them
as reliable secondary authority that accurately described the common-law
rules in this country. 19
In publishing the second set, the ALI had a very different purpose. 20
It would no longer strive “to present an orderly statement of the general
common law of the United States.” 21 Rather, its purpose was to change
the law as it had been stated in the first Restatement.22 It prescribed new
forms of analysis that would produce results that sometimes differed from
what accepted common-law rules produced. Although the ALI changed—
consciously and purposefully—its fundamental method for choosing law,
it nevertheless preserved for the second set the same title that it had used
when the ALI named the first set—”Restatements.” 23

Restatement movement in 1923 and its early development, Adams quotes Kalman as writing:
The [I]nstitute directed its reporters to “make certain much that is now uncertain and to
simplify unnecessary complexities” and “to promote those changes which will tend better
to adapt the laws to the needs of life.” As work progressed, the [I]nstitute abandoned the
second objective, telling its reporters to “state clearly and precisely in the light of the
decisions the principles and rules” of existing law. Increasing legal certainty became the
[I]nstitute’s only objective, a goal underlined by its decision to print the rules in especially
bold letters.
Id.
19. For an entertaining description of the fidelity that academics who worked on the first set of
Restatements held for the common law, see generally W. Barton Leach, The Restatements as They
Were in the Beginning, Are Now, and Perhaps Henceforth Shall Be, 23 A.B.A. J. 517, 519 (1937)
(“[T]he statements of the Institute were really statements by groups of school-teachers [i.e., law
professors]; for by necessity the basic work of the Institute has to be done by the Reporters and the
Advisory groups. . . . I as one of them do not deplore the fact that the American Bar seems not to be
ready to substitute decisions by professors arrived at in abstracto in the retirement of the conference
room for decisions by judges arrived at ad hoc in the presence of the contending vital forces of the
court room. We have our appropriate and very useful functions; but they are in aid of the traditional
processes of the common-law, not in substitution for them.”).
20. See Kansas v. Nebraska, 135 S. Ct. at 1064 (“Over time, the Restatements authors have
abandoned the mission of describing the law, and have chosen instead to set forth their aspirations for
what the law ought to be. . . . And it cannot safely be assumed, without further inquiry, that a
Restatement provision describes rather than revises current law.”).
21. Id.
22. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 17.
23. See Herbert Wechsler, Restatements and Legal Change: Problems of Policy in the
Restatement Work of the American Law Institute, 13 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 185 (1968). Herbert Wechsler
was executive director when the ALI published the Restatement (Second) Torts and started work on
the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. He described the attack directed at the ALI for
publishing rule 402A, “Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer,”
as black-letter law in a draft of its Restatement (Second) Torts. Id. at 187-92. Rule 402A was a
proposition that was followed in only a minority—perhaps even a distinctly small minority—of
jurisdictions. Id. at 189. Mr. Wechsler quotes verbatim the criticism leveled at the ALI. The critics
accused the ALI of dangerously misrepresenting the current state of American law by publishing a
minority rule as black-letter law in a “restatement.” Id. at 191 n.15.
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The most dramatic instance of that decision was the Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws. In the Introduction, the ALI stated:
[The Restatement (Second)] is far more than a current version of the
old. . . . [W]hat is presented here is a fresh treatment of the subject. . . .
The essence of that change has been . . . jettisoning . . . of rigid rules in
favor of standards of greater flexibility, [thereby] according sensitivity
in judgment to important values that were formerly ignored. Such a
transformation in the corpus of the law reduces certitude as well as certainty, posing a special problem in the process of restatement. . . . The
result presents a striking contrast to the first Restatement in which
dogma was so thoroughly enshrined. . . .

....
The retreat from dogma . . . is [a] pervasive . . . feature of this
work . . . . 24

Despite being a fundamentally “fresh treatment of the subject,” an
innovative “retreat from dogma” and a bold “jettisoning . . . of rigid
rules,” 25 the proselyting new treatise was palmed off as a “Restatement,”
a bait-and-switch that implied to all but the most diligent researcher that
the Restatement (Second) was—like the first—an objective but merely
updated synthesis of existing law. It was anything but that.
The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws was the ALI’s
“attempt to furnish rules in an area of law . . . rather than a systematic
record of the law as it actually is used by the courts.” 26 “As a descriptive
‘restatement,’ it was doomed to failure from the outset because it is
impossible to ‘restate’ a revolution that is in progress and whose outcome
is in doubt.” 27 Emerging from the midst of an upheaval, the Restatement
24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 17, at Introduction.
25. Id.
26. Sonja M. Haller, Note: Ohio Choice-of-Law Rules: A Guide to the Labyrinth, 44 Ohio St.
L.J. 239, 247–48 (1983) (citing E. SCOLES & P. HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 2.15 (1982)).
27. William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Prolegomenon to an Empirical Restatement
of Conflicts, 75 IND. L. J 417, 420 (2000). As recently as 2013, the ALI described its set of Restatement
(Second)s as genuine descriptions of law as the courts have announced it. In describing the whole set
of Restatements, the ALI assures the reader that “Restatement black-letter formulations assume the
stance of describing the law as it is.” Projects Overview, AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE,
http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=projects.main [http://perma.cc/78L6-MEJ6] (last visited
Aug. 21, 2013).
That representation about descriptiveness may well be true about the Restatements (Second) on some
subjects. It may even be true today about Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws in the minority
of jurisdictions that have wrapped themselves in it to some extent since 1971. But when the ALI first
offered the Restatement (Second), much of the restatement had been constructed of whole cloth—
”whole cloth” in this instance meaning little more supporting authority than the heatedly debated
theories about conflict of law advanced by “warring factions of choice-of-law
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(Second) inevitably became “a complex, negotiated settlement among
several warring factions of choice-of-law revolutionaries.” 28
The ALI tried “to present the widely divergent views extant at the
time and to jumble together incompatible schools of thought.” 29 “In fact,
the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws . . . stands as a warning
against the efforts to enshrine disparate and vacillating conflicts doctrines
in black-letter rules.” 30 Inevitably, the result was “a radically different
approach to choice of law,” 31 a jumbling “cacophony of discordant
voices,” 32 and “a system in which each case is decided as if it were unique
and of first impression. 33
Scholars recognized very early that the Restatement (Second)’s
system for choosing law amounts to little more than “legal
impressionism.” 34 They saw that it would become merely a disguise for a
process that is no more substantial or predictable than “judicial
intuition.” 35 By “mixing together all manner of doctrinal currents, it
simply furnished courts with any number of plausible reasons to support
whatever results they wished to reach.” 36 Some legal scholars pleaded
with the ALI not to publish the Restatement (Second). 37 They failed.
Larry Kramer, former dean of Stanford Law School, described the
state of affairs since ALI’s publication of the Restatement (Second)
Conflict of Laws. He sees the Restatement (Second) as having degraded
the role of law in conflicts analysis and, as a result, the persuasiveness of
judicial selections of controlling law.
[I]t is hard to read a lot of choice of law opinions without being terribly
disappointed in the quality of the analysis, which tends to be unsophisticated, unthoughtful, and often unreasoned. . . . Much of the blame can
revolutionaries.”Richman & Reynolds, supra, at 420.
28. Richman & Reynolds, supra note 27, at 420.
29. Friedrich K. Juenger, A Third Conflicts Restatement?, 75 IND. L. J. 403, 405 (2000). Arthur
Taylor von Mehren, Recent Trends in Choice-Of-Law Methodology, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 927, 964
(1975).
30. Id.
31. R. CRAMPTON, D. CURRIE & H. KAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES B COMMENTS B
QUESTIONS 117 (5th ed. 1993).
32. Juenger, supra note 29, at 404.
33. P. John Kozyris, Interest Analysis Facing Its Critics—And, Incidentally, What Should Be
Done About Choice of Law for Products Liability?, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 569, 580 (1985).
34. See, e.g., Kurt H. Nadelmann, Impressionism and Unification of Law, 24 AM. J. COM. L.
1, 11 (1976).
35. Patrick J. Borchers, Courts and the Second Conflict Restatement: Some Observations and
an Empirical Note, 56 MD. L. REV. 1232, 1233 (1997).
36. Juenger, supra note 29, at 406.
37. Albert A. Ehrenzweig, The Second Conflict Restatement, A Last Appeal for its Withdrawal,
113 U. PA. L. REV. 1230 (1965).
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perhaps be attributed to the dominance of the Second Restatement, since
its undirected, multifactor analysis invites post-hoc rationalizing of intuitions about the applicable law. Or perhaps this states the relationship
backwards, and it is the judges’ poor understanding of choice of law that
accounts for the dominance of the Second Restatement. Either way, the
level of discourse in the courts is depressingly low. 38

He is not alone in his dark assessment. Another critic has characterized
the situation that the Restatement (Second)’s method has produced:
greater uncertainty for litigants and added complexity for judges. She
observes that, due to the emergence of the Restatement (Second) Conflict
of Laws,
it has become difficult to predict what a court will do when faced with
choice of law issues, and each case seems to demand an ad hoc determination. For attorneys, this lack of predictability may discourage settlement; it certainly inhibits an accurate case valuation. For judges, choice
of law issues take an inordinate amount of time and require a fairly complex analysis.
The current situation has been described in a variety of ways, generally
unfavorably. It is “a total disaster,” “chaos,” “gibberish,” “a veritable
playpen for judicial policymakers, “. . . a maze constructed by professors drunk on theories.” 39

Justice Antonin Scalia has concluded that “it cannot safely be assumed,
without further inquiry, that a Restatement provision describes rather than
revises current law.” 40
The salient feature of Restatement (Second)’s method requires courts
to balance disparate, qualitatively dissimilar factors and considerations in
order to estimate which state with a possible interest in an issue in
litigation has the most significant relationship to the dispute in which the
issue has arisen. The thicket of factors that the Restatement (Second)
prescribes range from readily provable objective facts 41 to vague
abstractions that are incapable of evidentiary proof. 42

38. Larry Kramer, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 1990: Trends and Developments,
39 AM. J. COMP. L. 465, 466 (1991).
39. Wiegand, supra note 16, at 4 (internal citations omitted).
40. Kansas v. Nebraska, 135 S. Ct. at 1064.
41. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145(2)(c) (AM. LAW INST.
1971) (“the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the
parties . . . .”).
42. See, e.g., id. § 6(2)(a) (“the needs of the interstate and international systems”); § 6(2)(c)
(“the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those states in the
determination of the particular issue”).
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Section 6 is the lodestar of the Restatement (Second)’s approach to
choice of law. It sets forth the principles that underlie the method for all
choices of law, whether in torts, contracts, property law, trusts, etc. 43 In §
6 comment c, the ALI acknowledges that these foundational principles on
which its entire choice-of-law system is based will “point in different
directions in all but the simplest case.” 44 Many of the area-specific rules
for choosing law, which make up the bulk of the Restatement (Second),
are similarly unpredictive. 45
The Restatement (Second)’s kaleidoscopic balancing of hard fact
against abstract policy considerations is, of necessity, fundamentally
unpredictive. William L. Prosser, the renowned scholar of tort and
property law, described the impossibility of balancing evidentiary facts
against abstractions, like those that are featured in the Restatement
(Second). He said that abstract policy considerations “can no more be
balanced against evidence than ten pounds of sugar can be weighed
against half-past two in the afternoon.” 46 It is fair to say that criticism of
the ALI’s Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws has been deep, varied,
and severe.
B.

Choice of Law in Ohio under the Restatement (Second)

Although the Restatement (Second) is faulty, Ohio courts are obliged
to apply it in deciding choice-of-law questions. 47 And it has been clear
since American Interstate that all parts of the Restatement (Second)—not
just the 400-plus area-specific, black-letter choice-of-law rules—are part
of Ohio law.
43. Section § 6 contains a nonexhaustive list of considerations that a court is to take into account
in the absence of statutory directive of its own state on choice of law:
(2) . . . [T]he factors relevant to the choice of the applicable rule of law include
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those
states in the determination of the particular issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.
Id. § 6(2).
44. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST.1971).
45. See, e.g., Borchers, supra note 35, at 1238–39 (“[S]ection 145 [is] nearly as amorphous as
section 6. . . . [It] is no more definite than section 6, and perhaps even less so.”).
46. William L. Prosser, Res Ipsa Loquitur in California, 37 CAL. L. REV. 183, 225 (1949).
47. Am. Interstate Ins. Co. v. G&H Serv. Ctr., Inc., 112 Ohio St. 3d 521, 522 (2007). (“The
Morgan court adopted the Restatement in its entirety.”) (citing Morgan v. Biro Mfg. Co., 15 Ohio St.
3d 339, 341–42 (1984) (per curiam)).
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According to the Restatement (Second), a court faced with a conflict
of laws will approach it in three steps. Table 1 lays out the three-step
analysis in a visual format. First, Restatement (Second) § 7 requires the
court to characterize the legal issues. 48 Only by fitting issues into
appropriate legal classifications can the party urging the court to apply
foreign law demonstrate that the laws of the other state and the forum state
conflict. 49 To determine whether a conflict exists, the court must first
identify which group of subject-matter-specific rules within the
Restatement (Second) to use in analyzing the states’ respective
relationships to the dispute. 50 Without proper classification of the issues,
comparison is impossible. Because this classification is done, however,
solely for the purpose of the choice-of-law analysis, the law of the forum
state is generally used to determine the appropriate legal classification of
the dispute. 51

48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 7 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1971)
(“Characterization is an integral part of legal thinking. In essence, it involves two things: (1)
classification of a given factual situation under the appropriate legal categories and specific rules of
law, and (2) definition or interpretation of the terms employed in the legal categories and rules of law.
The factual situation must be classified to determine under what legal categories and rules of law it
belongs. Likewise, the terms employed in the legal categories and rules of law must be interpreted in
order that the factual situation may be placed under the appropriate categories and that the rules of
law may properly be applied.”).
49. See, e.g., Cross v. Carnes, 132 Ohio App. 3d 157, 168 (1998) (“[T]he party asserting the
application of the foreign law has the initial burden to demonstrate such a conflict. . . . Here,
appellants have failed to do the same. As a result, we will apply the law of the forum state,
Ohio . . . .”).
50. Ohayon v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Ill., 91 Ohio St. 3d 474, 476 (2001) (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 7, cmt. b (“‘[C]lassification of a given factual situation under the
appropriate legal categories and specific rules of law.’ . . . We must classify the Ohayons’ cause of
action before we answer the choice-of-law question raised in their complaint because different choiceof-law rules apply . . . .”)).
51. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 7(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1971) (“The
classification and interpretation of Conflict of Laws concepts and terms are determined in accordance
with the law of the forum, except as stated in § 8.”). Section 7 comment c states:
When the same legal term or concept appears both in the local law of a state and in its
choice-of-law rules, the meaning which has been given the term or concept in local law
does not determine the meaning to be given the term or concept in choice of law.
Id. § 7 cmt. c.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2017

11

Akron Law Review, Vol. 51 [2017], Iss. 2, Art. 6

518

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[51:507

Table 1 – Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws Analysis
Step 1:
Restatement (Second) § 7
(A) Court determines whether
foreign state law would characterize
the nature of claim as contractual or
restitutionary.
(B) Court determines what choice of
law the foreign state court would
apply to the claim.
Step 2:
Forum court identifies the state that
has the most significant relationship
to the disputed issues.

Restatement (Second) § 6,
and §§ 11-423

Step 3:
If the court finds (a) that a conflict
exists between the forum state’s
local law and that of the foreign
state and (b) that the foreign state
has the most significant relationship
to the issue in dispute, the court
must then decide how much of that
foreign state’s law to apply.

Restatement (Second) § 8

The following hypothetical will illustrate the operation of this first
step in the Restatement (Second)’s method. Assume that two insurance
companies, A and B, provide coverage to the same insured for successive
policy periods. The insured X, a resident of Ohio, was sued in Maryland
on a claim that triggered coverage under both company A’s policy and
company B’s policy. Insurance company A defended X in Maryland and
paid a judgment rendered against it. Having fully performed its
contractual obligation to provide coverage to the insured, company A sues
company B in Ohio claiming equitable contribution, seeking to recover
company B’s proportionate share of the obligation they owed to X.
Company A contends that their liability arises out of the insurance policies
and that Maryland’s contract law applies to the dispute over contribution.
Company B contends that A’s claim against B is for restitution, that there
is no privity between them, and that Ohio’s law regarding restitution
applies to the dispute. To decide whether the issues raised in A’s claim for
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relief is an action governed by contract law or by the law of restitution,
Ohio generally applies its own law to characterize the dispute. The court
would—probably 52—apply Ohio law and hold that the character of
company A’s claim against B is restitution, not contract. 53
The second step calls for the forum court to identify the state that has
the most significant relationship to the disputed issues. In the Restatement
(Second), this second step is addressed in § 6 and in §§ 11–423. A court
needs to conduct a choice of law analysis, however, only when there is an
actual conflict between Ohio’s local law (i.e., its substantive law
excluding its conflicts-of-law rules) and the local law of the other state.54
In the hypothetical described above, the court would compare Ohio’s law
of restitution with Maryland’s, applying the considerations listed in
Restatement (Second) § 221 Restitution to determine which state has the
more significant relationship with the claim for restitution.55
52. At one point, the Restatement (Second) seems to waffle on this point. Under the
hypothetical, the Ohio court may—or may not—first have to determine whether Maryland law would
characterize the nature of company A’s claim as contractual or restitutionary and, then, what choice
of law a Maryland court would make regarding whether to apply Maryland or Ohio’s law to company
A’s claim. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 7(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1971) supra note
51, and Sections IV and V infra.
53. Ohio regards claims between parties who share a common obligation to third parties as
claims for restitution. See Robinson v. Boyd, 60 Ohio St. 57, 65–66 (1899) (“[An action to recover a
shared obligation] is not founded on contract, but arises from the equitable consideration that persons
subject to a common duty or debt should contribute equally to the discharge of the duty or debt; and
so, where one performs the whole duty or pays the debt, or more than his aliquot part, each of the
others should contribute to him, so as to equalize the discharge of what was a common burden.”).
54. See Glidden Co. v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 112 Ohio St. 3d 470, 474–75 (2006) (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 1 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1971) (“[S]everal of the
appellate courts in Ohio . . . have held that an actual conflict between Ohio law and the law of another
jurisdiction must exist for a choice-of-law analysis to be undertaken.”)). See also Andersons, Inc. v.
Consol, Inc., 185 F. Supp. 2d 833, 836 (N.D. Ohio 2006); Mécanique C.N.C., Inc. v. Durr Envtl.,
Inc., 304 F. Supp. 2d 971, 975 (S.D. Ohio 2004) (“If the two states would use the same rule of law or
would otherwise reach the same result, it is unnecessary to make a choice of law determination
because there is no conflict of law.”).
55. § 221 Restitution
(1) In actions for restitution, the rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to the
particular issue are determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that
issue, has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the
principles stated in § 6.
(2) Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to determine the law
applicable to an issue include:
(a) the place where a relationship between the parties was centered, provided that the
receipt of enrichment was substantially related to the relationship,
(b) the place where the benefit or enrichment was received,
(c) the place where the act conferring the benefit or enrichment was done,
(d) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business
of the parties, and
(e) the place where a physical thing, such as land or a chattel, which was substantially
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But before beginning the comparison of the states’ respective
relationships with the dispute over restitution, the Restatement (Second)
instructs the forum court to narrow the field of states that are candidates
for having the most significant relationship and, therefore, having its law
applied to the disputed issues. 56 It is in this step, which is discussed more
fully in Section III below, that the Restatement (Second) urges the first
consideration of the choice-of-law rules that the foreign states’ courts
might use.
Third, if the court finds (a) that a conflict exists between the forum
state’s local law and that of the foreign state and (b) that the foreign state
has the most significant relationship to the issue in dispute, the court must
then decide how much of that foreign state’s law to apply. This third step
is addressed in Restatement (Second) § 8 and it is at this point that the
Restatement (Second)’s method of choosing law requires a second
consideration of the foreign states’ choice-of-law rules. This step is
addressed in Section III below.

III. THE IMPORTANCE OF A FOREIGN STATE’S CHOICE-OF-LAW RULES
TO THE FORUM COURT’S CHOICE-OF-LAW ANALYSIS

A.

Foreign State’s Choice-of-Law Rules as Relevant in the
Identification of the State Having the Most Significant Relationship

Most of the Restatement’s 400-plus black-letter rules are devoted to
suggestions, broken down by areas of law, for how to identify the state
having the most significant relationship in the disputed issues of law. In
the hypothetical described above, the Ohio court would assess Maryland’s
and Ohio’s respective relationships with the company’s disputed claim for
equitable contribution. Because Ohio characterizes the claim as one for
restitution, the court would analyze the interests under the considerations
listed in Restatement (Second) § 221 57 and § 6. 58
But before the forum court applies the black-letter rules, the
Restatement (Second) § 8 comment k directs the court to review the
related to the enrichment, was situated at the time of the enrichment.
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular
issue.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 221 (AM. LAW INST. 1971).
56. Id. § 6 cmt. c.
57. Id. § 221, supra note 55.
58. Id. § 6.
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foreign state’s choice-of-law rules to determine whether courts sitting
there would apply that state’s local law if the pending dispute had been
filed there. 59 This step is not the subject of a black-letter rule, but it is
mentioned repeatedly in the Restatement (Second).60 It is important as a
first step because, if taken, it may be able to short-cut an otherwise lengthy
choice-of-law analysis. The reason for this step is obvious, at least
according to the ALI’s way of thinking: if a court sitting in the other state
would not apply that state’s own local law to resolve the dispute, that fact
alone is enough—according to the Restatement (Second)—to demonstrate
that the other state does not have a significant relationship to the dispute.61
Thus, the forum court may remove a state from further consideration even
if the black-letter rules elsewhere in the Restatement might eventually
have identified that state as having the most significant relationship to the
dispute.
59. Id. § 8 cmt. k (“An indication of the existence of a state interest in a given matter, and of
the intensity of that interest, can sometimes be obtained from an examination of that state’s choiceof-law decisions. For example, the fact that a state’s choice-of-law decisions provide for application
of the local law of another state to determine a certain issue may afford some indication that the state
has little or no interest in the application of its relevant local law rule in the resolution of that issue.”).
60. See, e.g., Id. § 145 cmt. h (“[I]n judging a state’s interest in the application of one of its
local law rules, the forum should concern itself with the question whether the courts of that state
would have applied this rule in the decision of the case.”); § 149 cmt. c, illus. 1 (“If it were to be
found that an X court would not have applied its rule to the facts of the present case, the arguments
for applying the Y rule would be even stronger”); § 188 cmt. e, illus. 1; § 189 cmt. d, illus. 2 (“If, on
the other hand, it were to appear that the X courts would not apply their rule of incapacity to the facts
of the present case, there would be ground for the conclusion that no important interest of X would
be affected if the Z court were to uphold the contract by application of Y local law . . . .”); § 191 cmt.
f, illus. 6 (“If, on the other hand, it were to appear that the X courts would not apply their rule of
illegality to the facts of the present case, there would be ground for the conclusion that no important
interest of X would be affected if the Z court were to uphold the contract by application of Y local
law . . . .”); § 222 cmt. e (“[I]n judging a given state’s interest in the application of one of its local law
rules, the forum should concern itself with the question whether the courts of that state would have
applied this rule in the decision of the case.”); § 244 cmt. m ([I]n judging a given state’s interest in
the application of one of its local law rules, the forum should concern itself with the question whether
the courts of that state would have applied this rule in the decision of the case.”); § 283 cmt. m (“The
fact that these courts would not have applied their rule to invalidate the marriage provides conclusive
evidence that no sufficiently strong policy of this state is involved.”); § 287 cmt. h (“[I]n judging a
state’s interest in the application of one of its local law rules, the forum should concern itself with the
question whether the courts of that state would have applied this rule in the decision of the case.”); §
291 cmt. g (“[I]n judging a state’s interest in the application of one of its local law rules, the forum
should concern itself with the question whether the courts of that state would have applied this rule
in the decision of the case.”); § 302 cmt. j (“[I]n in judging a given state’s interest in the application
of one of its local law rules, the forum should concern itself with the question whether the courts of
that state would have applied this rule in the decision of the case.”); § 303 cmt. h (“The fact . . . that
the courts of the state of incorporation would not have applied their local law rule in the decision of
the particular issue may indicate that no important interest of that state would be infringed if the rule
were not applied by the forum . . . .”).
61. Id. § 8 cmt. k, supra note 59.
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In the hypothetical, the Ohio court would review Maryland’s choiceof-law principles to determine whether a Maryland court would, if
presented with the same case, apply Maryland law or the law of some
other state. The forum court would make this determination before
attempting to identify which state has the most significant relationship
with the dispute. According to the Restatement (Second), 62 if the Ohio
court found that a Maryland court would not apply Maryland’s law of
restitution to company A’s claim against company B, an Ohio court could
eliminate Maryland from further consideration. And that might well be
what would happen in the hypothetical. The Ohio court might well find
that a court in Maryland would apply the law of Ohio to this dispute
because, in the case of claims between insurers who allegedly insure the
same insured under separate contracts, Maryland will apply the law of the
state where the two contracts were made. 63 So, under the Restatement
(Second)’s elimination-step, Maryland would be eliminated from
consideration.
The inference that the ALI urges from a foreign state’s failure to
apply its own law to the dispute is hardly compelling. Whether a state has
the most significant relationship is an important—indeed, central—
feature of the Restatement (Second)’s method. But it is not the central
consideration in other theories for choice of law to which some other
states still cling. That, of course, is precisely the case with Maryland in
the hypothetical.
And Maryland is not an isolated example. A number of states still
follow the Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws. 64 The Restatement
(First) most often employed mechanistic determinations in making a
choice of law, focused on more tangible determinants than the often
intangible factors and abstract considerations that are used in the
Restatement (Second)’s system of analysis. The Restatement (First)’s rule
for choosing law in a dispute over the validity of a contract directs the
forum court to apply the law of the state where the agreement was
formed. 65 When the issues involve performance of a contract, the
62. Id.
63. See Interstate Fire & Cas. Co. v. Dimensions Assurance Ltd., 843 F.3d 133, 136–37 (4th
Cir. 2016) (quoting Perini/Tompkins Joint Venture v. Ace Am. Ins. Co., 738 F.3d 95, 100 (4th Cir.
2013)) (“In insurance contract disputes, Maryland follows the principle of lex loci contractus, which
applies the law of the jurisdiction where the contract was made. For choice of law purposes, a contract
is made where the last act is performed which makes the agreement a binding contract. Typically, this
is where the policy is delivered and the premiums paid.”) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
64. See Symeonides, supra note 16.
65. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 332 (AM. LAW INST. 1934).
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Restatement (First) directs the forum court to apply the law of the place
where performance under the contract was due. 66 The Restatement
(Second), by comparison, directs the forum to make the choice by
weighing a variety of factors 67 that vary depending on the subject matter
of the contract. 68 So, if a foreign state still follows the Restatement (First),
it would make a choice of law in a contract case without ever balancing
how significant the competing states’ interests are with respect to the
contract in dispute.
The elimination-step, while elemental, is antithetical to the
Restatement (Second)’s quest to identify the state with the most
significant relationship to the dispute. Because the Restatement (Second)
urges a forum court to ignore a state for reasons that have nothing to do
with the criteria it would otherwise use to assess the significance of that
state’s relationship to a dispute, this elimination-step induces the court to
drop a state from consideration for no better reason than that state uses a
choice-of-law system different from the Restatement (Second)’s. After
eliminating a state that may in fact have the more significant
relationship—as measured by the Restatement (Second)—the court may
be forced then to apply the law of a state that Restatement (Second)’s
method would otherwise have eliminated. Again, consider Maryland in
the hypothetical. It seems that to the ALI, proselytizing adherence to its
method is more pressing than identifying consistently the state with the
most significant relationship.

66. Id. § 358.
67. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 188 (1) and (2) state:
(1) The rights and duties of the parties with respect to an issue in contract are determined
by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant
relationship to the transaction and the parties under the principles stated in § 6.
(2) In the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties (see § 187), the contacts to
be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to determine the law applicable to
an issue include:
(a) the place of contracting,
(b) the place of negotiation of the contract,
(c) the place of performance,
(d) the location of the subject matter of the contract, and
(e) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business
of the parties.
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular
issue.
Id. § 188(1)–(2).
68. Id. § 188(3) states, “If the place of negotiating the contract and the place of performance
are in the same state, the local law of this state will usually be applied, except as otherwise provided
in §§ 189–199 and 203.”

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2017

17

Akron Law Review, Vol. 51 [2017], Iss. 2, Art. 6

524

AKRON LAW REVIEW

B.

The Foreign State’s Choice-of-Law Rules as Relevant in
Determining How Much of the Foreign State’s Law Should be
Applied

[51:507

The Restatement’s recommendation for deciding how much of the
other state’s law to apply is set out in § 8. The section is entitled
“Applicability of Choice-Of-Law Rules of Another State (Renvoi).” 69
Subparts (1) and (2) of § 8 identify the choice that the forum court faces—
whether to apply the other state’s “local law” (i.e., its substantive law
excluding its conflict-of-law rules) or “whole law” (i.e., its substantive
law plus its conflict-of-law rules). These two subparts of § 8 set up a
default rule and an exception.
Subpart (1) states what the ALI proposes as the default rule: when
the forum court state decides to apply the law of another state, the court
should apply only the local law of that state, i.e., only its substantive law,
ignoring the state’s conflict-of-law rules and principles. 70 The ALI
acknowledges, however, that this default rule creates a fundamental
problem. If the forum court applies only the local law of the other state,
the forum court may end up deciding the case differently from how a court
sitting in the other state would decide the very same case. 71 This potential
for inconsistency exists because, under the Restatement (Second)’s
default rule, the forum court will consciously ignore a segment of the other
state’s law—that state’s choice-of-law rules—even though a court sitting
in that state and faced with the identical case would necessarily apply
those rules. The ALI recognizes that this inconsistency of results is an
inescapable possibility under its default rule. 72 Subpart (2) states an
exception to the default rule of Subpart (1). It states that: “When the
objective of the particular choice-of-law rule is that the forum reach the
same result on the very facts involved as would the courts of another state,
the forum will apply the choice-of-law rules of the other state, subject to
considerations of practicability and feasibility.” 73

69. Id. § 8.
70. Id. § 8(1).
71. Id. § 8 cmt. l.
72. Id. § 8 cmt. d (“When reference is to ‘law’ of another state.. . . Here the word ‘law’, as it
appears in the choice-of-law rule in question, . . . can be characterized as referring to the local law of
the other state. If so, the matter at hand will not necessarily be decided as a court of the other
state would have decided in the actual case. . . . In the alternative, the word ‘law’ in the particular
choice-of-law rule can be characterized as referring to the entire law of the other state, including its
choice-of-law rules. If so, the effort will be made to decide the case in the same way as a court of the
other state would have decided on the very facts involved.”) (emphasis added).
73. Id. § 8(2).
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This black-letter rule in the Restatement (Second) instructs the forum
court to ignore the default rule and to apply the whole law of the foreign
state if to do so would serve a public policy of the forum state. 74
According to § 8, whether to apply the local law or the whole law of the
foreign state—i.e., the state with the most significant relationship as
measured by § 6 and §§ 11–423—is a question that is directly controlled
by the forum state’s public policy regarding its courts’ decisions being
uniform with judicial decisions of that other state. The Restatement
emphasizes the significance of this policy-choice by mentioning it twice
in the comments to § 8, once in comment g 75 and again in comment e. 76
These two comments are densely written, like most of the comments
in the Restatement (Second). But the point is eventually clear: subpart (2)
of § 8 recognizes that a forum state may well have a public policy that
encourages its courts to reach the same results as the courts of the other
state would reach. If the forum state has that policy, courts in the forum
state should apply the whole law of the foreign state. As the Restatement
(Second) puts it, if “the objective of the particular choice-of-law rule [in
the forum state] is that the forum reach the same result on the very facts

74. The Restatement (Second) makes clear—well, as clear as the Restatement (Second)’s style
of composition allows—that this consideration of the foreign state’s whole law is a different process
than what occurred in the elimination stage. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAW § 8 cmt.
k (AM. LAW INST. 1971) (“It should be made clear that in this instance [i.e., the state-elimination step]
a state’s choice-of-law decisions are consulted for a reason entirely different from that which gives
rise to the rules of [§ 8,] Subsections (1) and (2). In this instance, the forum consults the choice-oflaw decisions of one or more other states for whatever aid these decisions may give it in determining
which states have interests involved and which one of those states should be the state of the
applicable law. The rules of Subsections (1) and (2) do not come into play until a later stage in
the proceeding, namely, after the forum has already determined which is the state of the
applicable law. These rules then provide guidance to the forum in determining whether it should
apply the local law or the choice-of-law rules of the selected state.”) (emphasis added).
75. Id. § 8 cmt. g (AM. LAW INST. 1971) (“The forum should not interpret the word ‘law’ in its
choice-of-law rule as referring to the entire law, including the choice-of-law rules of another state,
unless the purpose sought to be achieved by the particular choice-of-law rule is that the forum
should reach the same result on the very facts involved as would the courts of the other state.
Achievement of this purpose can only be assured if the forum determines the rights and liabilities of
the parties in accordance with the same local law as would have been applied by the courts of the
selected state. The identity of this local law can only be ascertained by application of the latter state’s
choice-of-law rules.”) (emphasis added).
76. Id. § 8 cmt. e (“Usually, . . . a choice-of-law rule, whether contained in a statute or in the
common law, will do no more than direct application of the ‘law’ of a given state without further
explanation. In such a case, the forum should interpret the word “law” in its choice-of-law rule in the
light of that rule’s underlying purpose. In other words, the forum should make the answer to the
question whether the word ‘law’ in its choice-of-law rule refers to the local or to the entire law,
including the choice-of-law rules, of the given state depend upon which interpretation would be
most likely to result in the attainment of the objective which the rule was designed to achieve.”)
(emphasis added).
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involved as would the courts of another state,” 77 the forum state should
apply the whole law of the foreign jurisdiction, not just the local law of
the foreign state as the Restatement (Second)’s default rule prescribes.
C.

The Missed Steps

The labyrinthine process described above requires a forum court to
consider the foreign state’s choice-of-law rules twice: once, in
determining whether a state’s choice-of-law rules may disqualify that
state from the comparison of states’ respective interests and, later, in
determining how much of the dominant state’s law should be applied.
Although these steps are integral parts of the Restatement (Second)’s
overall system for choosing law, Ohio courts have routinely ignored both
of them and so have courts everywhere else. But the oversight has a
consequence. It increases the opportunity and incentive for parties to
engage in forum shopping.
It is difficult to understand why the first review of foreign choice-oflaw rules—to determine whether a particular foreign state would apply its
own local law to the conflict—is so often missed. That step is mentioned
repeatedly in the Restatement (Second). 78 Perhaps it is missed because the
repeated references appear, not in any of the Restatement’s black-letter
rules themselves, only in the comments with their often muddy, turgid
prose.
It is easier, however, to understand why the other step—the locallaw-versus-whole-law question—is missed. Even though the step is set
out in the bold-face text of § 8, the remaining 400-plus sections of the
Restatement (Second) consistently divert a casual reader’s attention away
from § 8.
The Restatement (Second) consistently, in section after section,
seduces the casual reader to believe that, when a court decides that a
foreign state has the most significant relationship to the dispute, the court
ipso facto also decides that the local law of the other state must apply.
Look at any of the numerous sections in the Restatement that list factors
for identifying the state whose law should apply―e.g., § 145 (torts), § 188
(contracts), § 216 (negotiable instruments), § 221 (restitution), § 246
(chattels), § 293 (agency), § 294 (partnerships), § 302 (corporations), §
371 (administration of estates), etc. The black-letter rule in each one of
these sections instructs flatly and categorically that, after assessing the

77.
78.

Id. § 8(2).
See supra note 60.
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listed factors, the court should apply the “local law” of the state that the
factors identify.
None of these black-letter rules prompts the reader to return to § 8.
None cautions the reader that the local-law-versus-whole-law choice has
merely been raised—not decided—by the court’s identification of a
foreign state’s predominant relationship to the dispute. None reminds the
reader that the forum state’s public policy becomes the central source of
law at this point in the Restatement’s choice-of-law system. Nor do any
of the sections explain how the application of only the local law, rather
than the whole law of a foreign state, advances the “certainty,
predictability and uniformity of result,” as urged in § 6(2)(f). 79 With the
issue of local-law-versus-whole-law so effectively hidden from view, it is
no surprise that courts, including those in Ohio, 80 so easily and so
routinely overlook the need to consider the forum state’s public policy.
D.

When Should the Whole Law of the Foreign State be Applied?

Most surprising about the Restatement (Second)’s treatment of the
local-law-versus-whole-law question is just how frequently—as
measured by the Restatement (Second) itself—the whole law of a foreign
state might be applied. Section 8(2) says that if the public policy of the
forum state favors deciding cases the same way they would be decided in
the courts of the state with the most significant relationship, the forum
should apply the whole law of the other state. A comment to Restatement
(Second) § 8 recommends, however, that public policy should favor
application of the whole law in only two narrow circumstances. Those
circumstances are discussed in § 8 comment h. 81 The descriptions of the
79. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2)(f) (AM. LAW INST. 1971).
80. See, e.g., Thomas v. Cook Drilling Corp., 79 Ohio St. 3d 547 (1997); Am. Interstate Ins.
Co. v. G & H Serv. Ctr., Inc., 165 Ohio App. 3d 104, 109 (2005); Knight v. Grange Mut. Cas. Co.,
2004 Ohio 6677 (App. 2004); Craft v. W. Reserve Mut. Cas. Co., 2004 Ohio 4105 (App. 2004).
81. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 8 cmt. h (Am. Law Inst. 1971) states:
When purpose of forum rule is attainment of same result. In at least two situations, the
purpose underlying the forum’s choice-of-law rule will be that the forum should reach the
same result on the very facts involved as would the courts of the other state. This will
usually be so when the other state clearly has the dominant interest in the issue to be
decided and its interest would be furthered by having the issue decided in the way
that its courts would have done. At least in part for this reason, questions relating to the
validity and effect of a transfer of interests in land are determined as the courts of the situs
would have done (see § 223). The second situation where the purpose underlying the
choice-of-law rule of the forum will usually be attainment of the same result as would
have been reached by the courts of the other state is where there is an urgent need
that all states should apply a single law in resolving a certain question. Here the forum’s choice-of-law rule may seek attainment of the same result as would have been
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two circumstances are, of course, obscure. What’s more, the Restatement
offers none of its customary hypothetical illustrations to clarify obscurity.
And the Reporter’s Notes likewise provide no explanation.
But the two narrow circumstances mentioned in § 8 comment h are
not the only public-policy considerations that should, according to the
Restatement (Second), influence a state’s formation of choice-of-law
rules. The bold-face text of § 6, the lodestar of the Restatement (Second)’s
choice-of-law scheme, states that in every instance where a court is
required to make a choice of law, “the factors relevant to the choice . . .
include . . . (f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result.” 82
Comment i to § 6 goes so far as to recognize that uniformity and
predictability are matters of public policy with overarching importance to
all areas of law, including choice of law. 83 It acknowledges that, without
uniformity and predictability in choice-of-law rules, courts are more likely
to decide the same dispute differently, directly creating an incentive for
litigants to forum shop. Stating the point conversely, the Restatement
(Second) says “[t]o the extent that they [i.e., uniformity and predictability]
are attained in choice of law, forum shopping will be discouraged.” 84 But
the point is clear.
E.

The Effect of Choosing the Whole Law Rather than Local Law

Even though the Restatement (Second) recognizes the overarching
importance of uniformity and predictability in the area of conflict of law,
it nevertheless recommends in § 8(1) that choice of the foreign state’s
local law be the default rule. 85 And in rule after rule thereafter, the
Restatement (Second) directs courts to apply only “local law.” 86 The
Restatement (Second) makes this recommendation repeatedly even
though that recommendation ignores § 8’s insistence on the local nature
of this policy question and even though § 6 openly acknowledges that the

reached by the courts of another state, not so much because the other state is the state of
dominant interest as because that state will usually have as great an interest in the matter
as any other and is also the state whose law is applied by the great majority of courts. . . .
(emphasis added).
82. Id. § 6(2)(f).
83. Id. § 6 cmt. i (“Predictability and uniformity of result. These are important values in all
areas of the law. To the extent that they are attained in choice of law, forum shopping will be
discouraged”).
84. Id.
85. Id. § 8(1).
86. Id.
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application of foreign local law encourages forum-shopping by
introducing the prospect of inconsistency and unpredictability. 87
Here’s how the Restatement (Second) rationalizes this odd
recommendation. It says that predictability and uniformity of results in
litigation:
[are] values [that] can . . . be purchased at too great a price. In a rapidly
developing area, such as choice of law, it is often more important that
good rules be developed than that predictability and uniformity of result
should be assured through continued adherence to existing rules. 88

Apart from the rationale itself, the reader cannot help but be surprised by
the reference here to “good rules.” The ALI must surely have meant “good
rulings.” “Rules” after all—whether good or bad—cannot emerge from a
case-by-case, subjective balancing of largely abstract, ad hoc
considerations; that is the essential method that permeates the
Restatement (Second). Indeed, the central objective of the Restatement’s
ubiquitous balancing processes is to produce not rules, but case-specific,
outcome-driven rulings. 89
And the rationale? The passage above is the full extent of the
justification that the ALI gives for abandoning consistency in the law that
a forum court and a foreign court will apply to the same case. It reflects a
view that gained prominence in a mid-twentieth-century campaign to
modernize how courts approached choice of law. Robert A. Leflar was a
prominent protagonist in the campaign. To him, the idea that law—at least
the law that directs courts in making a choice of law—could be based on
settled, predictive rules was a “mirage” and was “not so important” as its
proponents believed. 90 The ALI’s Restatement (Second) embodies
Leflar’s view of the legal process, holding it is better that unpredictability,
uncertainty, and forum-shopping be universally encouraged than that a
less-than-”good” ruling occasionally emerge when courts adhere to
knowable, predictive choice-of-law rules. In the ALI’s view, judges
should be set free to make “good” rulings and, to do this, they must be
released from the common-law obligation to articulate transcendent rules
for application to particular cases.

87. Id. § 6 cmt. i.
88. Id.
89. See id. cmt. j (“[I]t is obviously of greater importance that choice-of-law rules lead to
desirable results [than that the choice-of-law rules be easily determinable in advance or that they be
easily applied to existing disputes].”).
90. Robert A. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV.
267, 267–68 (1966).
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The result? As one observer put it, American conflicts law “has
become a tale of a thousand-and-one-cases” in which “each case is
decided as if it were unique and of first impression.” 91 The method of the
Restatement (Second) fulfills precisely the prediction that Samuel
Williston, the great contracts scholar and Chief Reporter for the first
Restatement of Contracts, sadly uttered about the future of American law:
it will be “a wilderness of single instances.” 92
It is impossible to overstate the consequence of a system that
formulates decision-making as merely a subjective balancing of
numerous, vague considerations that are not ranked in any particular order
of importance and that often defy comparison. That system washes away
the rule of law, which is the very ground on which the legitimacy of the
judicial process rests, as the common law conceived it.
The common-law idea of the rule of law is not an amorphous
abstraction. It espouses that whenever a particular set of provable
circumstances or conditions are shown to exist, a particular legal result
will obtain. Consistency, in other words, is a premise of the common-law
tradition. Lord Mansfield admonished that “[w]e must act alike in all cases
of like nature.” 93 Putting that admonition more concretely, Justice
Benjamin Cardozo warned that it is anathema to “decide the same
question one way between one set of litigants and the opposite way
between another. . . . Adherence to precedent must . . . be the rule rather
than the exception if litigants are to have faith in the evenhanded
administration of justice in the courts.” 94 The Restatement (Second)’s
system guarantees only one thing: that the faith about which Justice
Cardozo wrote has been, at last, displaced. In its stead, the ALI espouses
as a tenant of faith that transcendent wisdom—or in the words of the
Restatement (Second), “good rules” 95—will more assuredly emerge when
individual judges are freed to gather their surmises and idiosyncratic
impressions and then to mix them, case-by-case, into a mystic balancing
of qualitatively dissimilar factors and considerations.

91. PETER HAY, PATRICK J. BORCHRERS, & SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, CONFLICT OF LAWS 123
(5th ed. 2010) (quoting P. John Kozyris, Interest Analysis Facing Its Critics, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 569,
578, 580 (1985)).
92. Samuel Williston, Change in the Law, 69 U. S. L. REV. 237, 240 (1935) (internal quotations
omitted).
93. William Murray, 1st Earl of Mansfield, Lord Chief Justice of the King’s Bench, quoted in
Ward v. James, 1 Q.B. 273, 294 (1965).
94. B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 33–34 (1921).
95. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 cmt. i (AM. LAW INST. 1971).
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Local-Law-Versus-Whole-Law in Ohio

Nothing in the Restatement (Second), of course, binds a forum state
to follow the Restatement (Second)’s path to chaos. Nothing in the
Restatement forecloses a state from endorsing a public policy that—
contrary to the urging of the ALI—discourages forum-shopping. And
nothing prohibits a state from enforcing that policy through its choice-oflaw rules. To the contrary, it is unequivocally the ALI’s position—at least
in § 8, if not in the remainder of the Restatement (Second)—that the
choice between applying a foreign state’s local law and its whole law is a
question to be decided according to locally-defined public policy of the
forum state. 96 In fact, leading contemporary scholars support this
uncommon application of § 8’s references to public policy and the whole
law of the state with the most significant relationship with the dispute.97
And the door is open in Ohio to pursue that course.
The Ohio Supreme Court has never yet considered the policy
question presented in § 8 that is the foundation for the choice between the
whole law of a foreign state and its local law. In fact, the court has never
been required to reach that question of public policy. There are several
reasons why not.
For one, the local-law-versus-whole-law issue—at least as it is
presented in § 8—has rarely arisen. Most often, the supreme court has
concluded that Ohio law, not a foreign state’s law, applies in the cases
before it. 98 The court, of course, can reach the local-law-versus-wholelaw question only if it has ruled that the law of a foreign state applies.
Second, when the court has concluded that foreign law should apply, it
frequently has done so because the parties themselves agreed that foreign
local law should control. In these cases, it only makes sense that the parties
would choose local law of the chosen jurisdiction, 99 and the court usually
96. Id. § 8 cmt. e.
97. See, e.g., E. SCOLES et al., CONFLICT OF LAWS supra note 91, § 3.14 (“[F]ew American
courts have adopted the more extensive use of [the whole law of the state with the most significant
relationship] as suggested by § 8 of the Second Restatement. . . . [E]ven greater openness on the part
of the courts to the content of the foreign jurisdiction’s choice-of-law rules would be desirable . . . .
Uniformity should remain a principal goal of conflicts law; it is not always served by an interest
analysis in which local interests tend to dominate. . . .”).
98. See, e.g., Ohayon v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Ill., 91 Ohio St. 3d 474, 478 (2001) (applying Ohio’s
choice-of-law rules, the court determined that the local law of Ohio should apply).
99. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 cmt. h (AM. LAW INST. 1971) (“When
they choose the state which is to furnish the law governing the validity of their contract, the parties
almost certainly have the ‘local law,’ rather than the ‘[whole] law,’ of that state in mind . . . . To apply
the ‘[whole] law’ of the chosen state would introduce the uncertainties of choice of law into the
proceedings and would serve to defeat the basic objectives, namely those of certainty and
predictability, which the choice-of-law provision was designed to achieve.”).
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honors that choice. 100 Finally, in those rare cases where the supreme court
has held that foreign law should apply and thus, where the court might
have reached the policy issue that underlies the local-law-versus-wholelaw question, the court merely assumed—but did not decide—that the
local law rather than the whole law of the foreign state would apply. The
court routinely proceeds on this assumption because the parties have not
raised the local-law-versus-whole-law question as a distinct step in the
choice-of-law analysis. 101
Only one court in Ohio has ever considered the policy implications
of the local-law-versus-whole-law choice. It was a case decided long
before the ALI announced its position in the Restatement (Second)’s § 8.
In Nolan v. Borger, 102 the court chose to apply a foreign state’s whole law
rather than merely local law. It reasoned that to choose only the local law
could result in the forum court deciding the central, substantive question
in the case in a way that differs from how a court sitting in the state with
the most significant relationship would decide it.103
A number of lower court cases in Ohio, of course, have stated
unqualifiedly—although again without explanation—that the local law of
the foreign state applies. These decisions are of two kinds. One group
simply cites dictum from Ohayon v. Safeco Insurance Co. of Illinois,
where the supreme court mentioned the possible applicability in that case
of the foreign state’s local law. 104 These lower courts fail to recognize that
the supreme court did not—and could not—decide the local-law-versuswhole-law question in Ohayon. Having found that Ohio law, not foreign
law, applied in that case, the question about whether to apply the local law
or whole law of the foreign state did not arise. 105

100. See, e.g., Schulke Radio Prod., Ltd. v. Midwestern Broad. Co., 6 Ohio St. 3d 436, 438
(1983) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (AM. LAW INST. 1971)) (“The
law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual rights and duties will be applied,
even if the particular issue is one which the parties could not have resolved by an explicit provision
in their agreement directed to that issue . . . .”).
101. See, e.g., Morgan v. Biro Mfg. Co., 15 Ohio St. 3d 339 (1984) (per curiam) (noting that
the parties did not contest whether, if Kentucky law were to apply, it would be the whole law of
Kentucky or merely the local law).
102. Nolan v. Borger, 203 N.E.2d 274, 278 (1942).
103. Id.
104. Ohayon v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Ill., 91 Ohio St. 3d 474, 479 (2001) (emphasizing the
importance of the several factors in choice of law analysis).
105. See, e.g., Akins v. Harco Ins. Co., 158 Ohio App. 3d 292, 2004-Ohio-4267, 815 N.E.2d
686, at ¶¶ 13-14, at 296–97; Garcia v. Green, 2003-Ohio-3841, at ¶¶ 15-22, at *2–*3; Nationwide Ins.
v. Phelps, 2003-Ohio-497 at ¶¶ 15–17, at *3; Hofle v. General Motors Corp., 2002-Ohio-7152, at ¶¶
8–10, at *2.
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The other group simply follows the misleading black-letter
references to “local law” in the Restatement (Second), without making the
policy-choice that the black-letter rule stated in Restatement (Second) § 8
recognizes the forum court must make. 106 Because none of the decisions
in either group has considered the public-policy question necessarily
raised by the choice of a foreign state’s law, the courts’ eventual
application of a foreign state’s local law has no precedential value on how
Ohio would resolve the policy question if a court were ever to address it.
A decision has no precedential weight on a question the court did not
consider.
G.

A Public Policy Exists in Ohio

Although courts in Ohio have not yet explored how Ohio’s public
policy affects the local-law-versus-whole-law question, a public policy is
clear. The Supreme Court of Ohio and lower courts have been consistent
in resisting the interpretation of any statute, court rule, or common-law
principle that would have the effect of creating the possibility of
inconsistent rulings between jurisdictions and, therefore, have the effect
of encouraging forum-shopping.
A policy against forum-shopping was cited—often as a ratio
decidendi—in cases that involve, for example, the effect of voluntary
dismissals of claims, 107 out-of-state visitation decrees, 108 concurrent

106. See, e.g., Seaford v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 159 Ohio App. 3d 374, 2004-Ohio-6849, 399, 824
N.E.2d 94, 113, at ¶ 75, at 399, rev’d on other grounds,106 Ohio St. 3d 430 (2005); Carrington Farms
Dev. Co. v. Pulte Home Corp., No. L-97-1300, 1998 WL 336927 (Ohio App. 6th Dist. May 22, 1998);
Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Leeper, No. L-97-1265, 1998 WL 123108, at *2 (Ohio App. 6th Dist. Mar. 13,
1998); Jernigan v. Columbia Elec. Mfg. Co., Nos. 63441, 63442, 1992 WL 388872 (Ohio App. 8th
Dist. Dec. 17, 1992); U. S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Carter-Jones Lumber Co., No. 92-P-0032, 1992 WL 267417
(Ohio App. 11th Dist. Sept. 30, 1992); Makepeace v. Chrysler Motors Corp., C.A. No. L-80-187,
1981 WL 5572, at *6 (Ohio App. 6th Dist. May 8, 1981).
107. Carter-Jones Lumber Co. v. B & A Bldg. Servs., No. 07CA000003, 2008 WL 62288, at ¶
41, (Ohio App. 5th Dist. Jan. 4, 2008) (“To accept appellee’s argument [that voluntary dismissal
makes a judicial decision null] would give an imprimatur to forum shopping as clearly evidenced in
this case.”).
108. In re Gibson, 61 Ohio St. 3d 168, 172 (1991) (“Ohio has reasonably determined that . . .
[out-of-state visitation decrees] should be enforced to discourage . . . forum shopping”).
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jurisdiction, 109 dual rights of appeal, 110 cross-jurisdictional tolling, 111
custody orders, 112 statutory interpretation, 113 property interests, 114
personal jurisdiction, 115 judicial disqualification, 116 and availability of
declaratory judgments. 117 In short, a policy against forum-shopping is
broadly recognized in Ohio.

109. Friedman v. Johnson, 18 Ohio St. 3d 85, 87–88 (1985) (holding that subject matter
jurisdiction was exclusive in one court rather that concurrent in two courts in order to avoid creating
an opportunity for “forum-shopping”); Kraus v. Hanna, No. 2002-P-0093, 2004 WL 1662248, at ¶
34, at *5 (Ohio App. 11th Dist. July 23, 2004) (explaining that jurisdiction in common pleas court
general division was exclusive and not concurrent with probate court because to “hold otherwise . . .
would allow the estate to ‘forum shop’”) (internal citations omitted).
110. Harris v. Lewis, 69 Ohio St. 2d 577, 581 (1982) (explaining that the dual right to appeal
was found not to exist because it would “promote forum shopping”); Davis v. State Personnel Bd. of
Review, 64 Ohio St. 2d 102, 106 (1980) (“If a dual right of appeal were allowed . . . [it would
promote] forum-shopping, and would inevitably result in a needless increase in the cases brought
before this court.”); Althof v. State, State Bd. of Psychology, No. 04CA16, 2006 WL 279229, ¶ 12,
at *3 (Ohio App. 4th Dist. Jan 31, 2006) (“[D]ual appeals advance the unfavorable practice of forum
shopping.”).
111. Vaccariello v. Smith & Nephew Richards, Inc., 94 Ohio St. 3d 380, 394 (2002) (Lundberg
Stratton, J., dissenting) (“[C]ross-jurisdictional tolling rule . . . invit[es] plaintiffs to forum-shop, a
practice that this court does not promote and does not wish to encourage.”).
112. In re I.B., Nos. 102373, 102853, 2015-Ohio-4181, slip op., at ¶ 30, at *6 (Ohio App. 8th
Dist. Oct. 8, 2015) (“Appellant’s complaint seeking legal custody in the juvenile court is the kind of
forum shopping barred by virtue of R.C. 2151.23(A)(2).”); Parker v. Jamison, No. 02CA002857, 2003
WL 24135688, at ¶ 24, at *5 (Ohio App. 4th Dist. Nov. 26, 2003) (“[The] limitation of the court’s
authority . . . [necessitated] to prevent forum shopping when another court has already issued a
custody order.”).
113. Schottenstein v. Schottenstein, No. 00AP-1088, 2003 WL 22176786, at ¶ 11, at *3 (Ohio
App. 10th Dist. Nov. 29, 2003) (“[T]he purpose of the restriction in R.C. 3113.31(E)(1)(d) is to
prevent a party from forum-shopping.”).
114. Am. Home Products Corp. v. Tracy, 152 Ohio App. 3d 267, 274 (2003) (“‘Uniform
treatment of property interests by both state and federal courts within a State serves to. . . discourage
forum shopping . . . .’”) (quoting Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979)).
115. Estate of Poole v. Grosser, 134 Ohio App. 3d 386, 394 (1999) (finding that extension of
personal jurisdiction over a Kentucky resident is not permitted because “[c]ourts discourage this type
of forum shopping”).
116. Grimes v. Oviatt (In re Disqualification of Eighth Dist. Court of Appeals), No. 104491,
slip op., 2017-Ohio-2840, ¶ 6 (Mar. 31, 2017) (“To hold otherwise would invite parties to file
disciplinary grievances solely to obtain a judge’s disqualification, which could lead to forumshopping and hamper the orderly administration of judicial proceedings.”).
117. State of Ohio ex rel. Fattler v. Boyle, No. 70522, 1997 WL 428664, at *583 (Ohio App.
8th Dist. July 31, 1997), aff’d Ohio St. 3d 123 (1998) (finding that mandamus is not available in the
court of appeals while a declaratory judgment action is pending in the trial court because to recognize
the possibility for a second court to contemporaneously consider the dispute would encourage judicial
forum shopping).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Ohio is stuck with the Restatement (Second)—at least for now. As a
method for choosing law, it is unnecessarily complicated, abstract, and
confusing. Worst of all, it is highly subjective and unpredictable. Its faults
are only exacerbated when courts ignore facets of the Restatement
(Second)’s method. Ignoring portions of the method produces an analysis
that is also random or selective. As discussed above, two steps built into
the Restatement (Second)’s system are routinely missed.
One of the missed steps, however, offers the prospect of resurrecting
some degree of consistency and predictability in the Restatement
(Second)’s method, albeit in only a limited number of cases. Those
instances are limited to cases where the forum court identifies a foreign
state as having the most significant relationship with a dispute. At that
moment in the choice-of-law process, Restatement (Second) § 8 makes it
the forum court’s duty to determine how much of the foreign state’s law
to apply. It must decide whether to apply all of the law that a court sitting
in that foreign state would apply if the case were pending there or just
some of it. In the latter alternative, the forum court will apply all of that
state’s local law except its choice-of-law rules and principles. This
alternative, however, guarantees that the forum court will decide the case
after applying different law than what a court sitting in the state with the
most significant relationship with it would apply. Deciding the same case
by applying different law creates the prospect that the forum court will
reach a different result than would a court sitting in the foreign state.
This prospect of the forum state possibly reaching a different result
than the foreign state is very dynamic that spawns forum-shopping. For a
jurisdiction that, like Ohio, has recognized a policy discouraging forumshopping, Ohio Restatement (Second) § 8(2) provides the rubric that—if
used—can give palpable effect to that policy.
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